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OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Petitioner Armstrong Agbortabi seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s order reversing the decision of the Immigration Judge to grant his application
for political asylum and withholding of removal and ordering him removed.  We have
jurisdiction to review the Board’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We will vacate and
remand.
I. 
On May 23, 2002, the IJ granted Agbortabi withholding of removal but denied his
asylum request.  The IJ based his decision in part on an article about Agbortabi in the
Watchman, a newspaper from Agbortabi’s homeland of Cameroon.  Subsequently, a
report by a consular investigative assistant (“CIA”) with the U.S. Consulate in Cameroon
questioned the authenticity of the article as well as other documents submitted by
Agbortabi, including two documents (titled “Convocation” and “Warrant of Arrest”)
purported to be from the Ministry of Justice in Douala, Cameroon, and the affidavit of a
barrister in Cameroon.  On remand from the BIA with instruction to consider the CIA
report, the IJ, following a hearing, examined the report at length but again granted
3withholding of removal.  Deciding the IJ’s analysis was insufficient and failed to
explicitly include a credibility determination, the BIA again remanded the case to the IJ.
Following the second remand, the IJ reconsidered the case with both parties
declining to offer further evidence.  On March 11, 2004, the IJ issued a lengthy decision
granting Agbortabi withholding of removal as well as asylum.  Although considering the
CIA report at length, the IJ explicitly found Agbortabi credible.  The IJ’s decision was
again reviewed by the BIA, which found the IJ’s credibility determination clearly
erroneous.  The BIA then independently made an adverse credibility determination and
ordered Agbortabi removed.  Agbortabi appealed, and we remanded to the BIA to clarify
whether it had inappropriately enagaged in de novo review and whether it was required to
remand to the IJ on these facts.  In a decision dated May 22, 2006, the BIA confirmed its
application of a clear error, as opposed to de novo, standard of review and also stated it
found no statutory or regulatory requirement for remand.  This petition for review
followed. 
II.
Where, as here, the BIA issues a decision on the merits, we review the BIA’s,
rather than the IJ’s, order.  Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  We
review factual findings, including credibility determinations, under a substantial evidence
standard.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (codifying INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
483-84 (1992)); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under this
deferential standard, we will reverse the BIA’s decision only “if the evidence is such that
4a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude otherwise.”  Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  “So long as the BIA’s
decision is supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole, we will not disturb the BIA’s disposition of the case.’”  Id.
(quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481).
III.
The BIA found the IJ’s credibility determination clearly erroneous, because the
BIA found the IJ erred in its evaluation of the CIA report.  The BIA found the report,
when properly evaluated, should have been afforded significant weight in determining
Agbortabi’s credibility.
In its review of the IJ’s credibility determination, the BIA examined the
significance of the CIA report in potentially discrediting the documents submitted by
Agbortabi.  With respect to the Watchman newspaper article, the BIA found the IJ erred
in criticizing the consular investigation into the article and finding that the probative
value of the article had not been rebutted.  The BIA’s finding on the article was based on
evidence that additional copies of the article had not been located during a six-month
period after the article “appeared” and that several interviewees in the location of the
paper’s origin were unfamiliar with it.  But as the IJ identified, the CIA investigation
found an independent newspaper manager who, although unfamiliar with the particular
article, confirmed the newspaper was a legitimate publication and detailed the region of
its circulation.   In light of this fact, substantial evidence does not support the conclusion
     1  The IJ questioned the report’s revelations as to the fraudulent nature of Agbortabi’s
convocation and arrest warrant documents, because the source of the information was an
official of the government allegedly persecuting Agbortabi.  Because he perceived the
source would have a motive to lie in this situation, the IJ discounted the weight of the
CIA report as part of his credibility determination.
5
that the newspaper article did not exist.  Accordingly, the IJ appropriately considered the
newspaper article as relevant to his credibility determination.
But the CIA report also spoke to the apparently fraudulent nature of Agbortabi’s
other documents.  While the IJ expressly credited the report in his decision and stated he
had carefully considered it, he discounted its significance based on his uncertainty as to
the veracity of the report’s source.1   The BIA found this rationale behind the IJ’s
evaluation of the report was based on speculation and therefore improper.  Primarily for
this reason, the BIA found the IJ’s credibility determination clearly erroneous.
After finding the IJ’s credibility determination clearly erroneous, the BIA found
Agbortabi not credible and ordered his removal.  In this regard, the Board independently
weighed and balanced the underlying facts relevant to Agbortabi’s credibility.  We do not
hold the BIA may not make an independent credibility determination where it finds the
IJ’s determination clearly erroneous.  But in this case the BIA should have remanded to
the IJ for a new credibility determination properly considering and weighing all of the
relevant factors.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 279 (3d Cir. 2002) (upon vacating a
credibility determination, remanding for the IJ to make a new credibility determination
and to decide the petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal claims without reliance
6on the credibility determination previously made).  Our approach in Dia v. Aschroft, 353
F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003), is instructive:
Dia asks that we reverse the BIA and grant the relief he seeks. But we are
not finding Dia credible. Rather, we are concluding, as we have repeatedly
before, that because of the lack of substantial evidence to support the
adverse credibility determination, we will remand in order for the agency to
further explain or supplement the record.  Moreover, as we have recently
said: “We will not assess [Dia's] entitlement to relief based on the record as
we have required it to be modified by this opinion because the agency
should have the opportunity to do so.” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d
396, 411 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17-18
(2002)); see also Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating, under similar circumstances, that “[t]he IJ should then reach the
questions of asylum and withholding of deportation in light of such
evidence, but without regard to its prior adverse credibility determination”);
Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (remanding to BIA
with instructions to remand to IJ for decision on asylum and withholding
application, but without consideration of erroneous adverse credibility
finding reversed on appeal).
Id. at 260-61.
The government contends the BIA acted properly because its reversal of the IJ
based on its assessment of the CIA report is conclusive as to Agbortabi’s credibility. 
Specifically, the government asserts that the CIA report shows Agbortabi submitted
fraudulent documents as part of his application for asylum, and that this fact–when
appropriately considered by the IJ–renders Agbortabi per se not credible.  The
government relies on In re O-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1079, 1998 WL 24904 (BIA 1998)
[hereinafter O-D-].  But O-D- did not hold that the submission of fraudulent documents
necessitates a per se adverse credibility determination.  The Board in O-D- explained that
7such facts were indicative of a lack of credibility, and a “critical factor” of the analysis,
but not dispositive in determining credibility.  See id. at *1083.  The Board further wrote:
[I]n the context of an asylum adjudication, there may be instances in which
a respondent voluntarily and intentionally submits a document into
evidence, intending to establish his eligibility for asylum, that is later shown
to be counterfeit.  The adjudicator may consider whether that document
points to a respondent’s lack of credibility regarding the asylum claim. 
Ordinarily, it is reasonable to infer that a respondent with a legitimate claim
does not usually find it necessary to invent or fabricate documents in order
to establish asylum eligibility.  On the other hand, there may be reasons,
fully consistent with the claim of asylum, that will cause a person to possess
false documents, . . . .
We find that this respondent’s presentation of at least one counterfeit
document, and probably two, submitted to prove a central element of the
claim in an asylum adjudication, indicates his lack of credibility.  We also
find that the presentation of such questionable documents, in the absence of
an explanation regarding such presentation, creates serious doubts
regarding the respondent’s overall credibility.
Id. (emphases added).
Moreover, the O-D- opinion contained extensive discussion of “other
considerations” that, taken together with the fraudulent documents submitted there,
properly supported an adverse credibility finding in that case.  See id. at *1083-1084. 
One of those considerations given great weight was the adverse credibility finding of the
IJ in that case, id. at *1084, a determination to which the Board in O-D- recognized it was
required to afford great deference, see id. (citations omitted).  
Here, the IJ found Agbortabi wholly credible and suggested he would reach the
same conclusions irrespective of the “fraudulent” nature of the documents based on
Agbortabi’s testimony and several other factors such as State Department reports about
8the conditions in Cameroon.  See In re Agbortabi, A71-031-696, Decision of the
Immigration Judge, April 21, 2004, at 10-11.  Although the BIA found the IJ’s credibility
determination clearly erroneous, the IJ’s error in evaluating the CIA report is not
necessarily conclusive as to Agbortabi’s credibility.  As in O-D-, a proper determination
of Agbortabi’s credibility will evaluate “other considerations” in addition to the CIA
report.  Consequentially, the IJ must make a new credibility determination on remand
appropriately weighing the CIA report.  But in making this determination, the IJ will also
be entitled to consider the Watchman article, to the extent he finds it authentic, as well as
State Department country reports, and all other appropriate factors. 
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the decision of the BIA and remand with
instructions that the matter be remanded to the IJ for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
